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Introduction

Brian Wampler and Michael Touchton



The ongoing mobilization of citizens and civil society organizations
(CSOs) profoundly marks national and local politics across Latin America and the developing world. In the twenty-first century, citizens and
CSOs) now have access to an expanded repertoire of political activities
that they can employ to influence public officials, private corporations,
and their fellow citizens (Oxhorn 2011). These political activities include
protesting and engaging in contentious politics; being involved in campaigns and elections, party politics, and clientelistic exchanges; forming
community organizations; lobbying government officials; and working
within incremental policy-making decisions (Escobar and Álvarez 1992;
Fox 2007; Friedman and Hochstetler 2002; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly
2003; Abers and Keck 2013; Lavalle, Acharya, and Houtzager 2005).
Citizens and CSOs are now able to link themselves to each other and to
a wider array of organizations by taking advantage of new democratic
institutions, the partial protection of basic liberties, expanded educational
opportunities, and decreased transportation and communication costs
(Avritzer 2002 and 2009; Pires 2011). Citizens form and join CSOs to
advance both narrow and broad interests, from improving public security to challenging extractive industries to installing infrastructure in their
respective streets to improving basic education and health care (Jacobi
1989).
In this article, we ask how CSOs engage the state, public officials,
and new democratic institutions. We draw from an original survey of 863
CSO leaders across seven Brazilian cities to evaluate three distinct strategies: engaging in contentious politics, entering into direct contact with
public officials (elected and civil servants), and participating directly in
participatory policy-making institutions. The data we use in this article
enables us to better explain why certain CSOs are likely to pursue specific strategies. This in turn provides us with a window into the broader
issue of how Brazilian state-society relations are being reconstituted as a
result of the civil liberty protections often afforded to protestors, the
expansion of contracting and outsourcing, and the implementation of a
wide architecture of participatory institutions.
We employ a pluralistic and expansive understanding of civil society, which we define as the sphere of social and political associational
activity separate from the state, the market, and the family (Cohen and
Arato 1992). Jeffrey Alexander argues that “civil society is a sphere of
solidarity in which individual rights and collective obligations are tensely
intertwined” (Alexander 2006: 53). “Bonds of solidarity” thus help organized groups to forge ongoing alliances in order to pressure government
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officials, public and private corporations, and their fellow citizens in
pursuit of their political and policy goals. “Civil society organization” is
an umbrella concept that incorporates a wide range of collective groups;
social movements, community-based organizations, and “third-sector”
organizations are all prominent within this category. These organizations
have diverse sets of interests – organizing communities and potential
allies, establishing a coherent political and policy agenda, and working to
achieve social change (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). The umbrella concept of the CSO allows us to recognize the diversity of organizational type and interest as well as explain strategic choices in each area.
Three interrelated political processes now frame civil society organizing in Brazil. First, the return of representative democracy in the mid1980s and the subsequent extension of basic protections permitted many
CSOs to engage in contentious political activity.1 Second, the expansion
of participatory institutions now allows CSOs to have unprecedented
contact with public officials as well as their fellow CSO leaders in public
policy-making processes. Third, Brazil moved toward a neodevelopmentalist state and invested much more heavily in social welfare policies
during the country’s economic expansion between 2000 and 2009 (Sugiyama 2012; Montero 2014). These political processes influence CSOs’
political and organizational opportunities and, in turn, the strategies they
use to pursue their interests.
Our analysis reflects two distinct types of CSO activities. First,
“community-based” CSOs from poorer cities – whose leaders have lower socioeconomic status (SES – as measured by income, level of formal
education, and race) and do not hold government contracts to provide
social services – are most likely to engage the state through direct contact
with public officials, be involved in participatory institutions, and use
contentious protest. It is noteworthy that CSOs from the poorest communities engage in a wide range of political activities. Surprisingly, they
also appear to have a more diverse set of political strategies than CSOs
from wealthier cities and those with leaders that have higher SES. We
argue that the renewal of civil society, the creation of a new party system,
and the establishment of new democratic institutions explain why relatively resource-poor organizations are now using a diverse set of strategies (Heller 2012; Sandbrook et al. 2007).
Second, third-sector CSOs in relatively wealthy cities – whose leaders have relatively high SES and hold government contracts to provide
1

Of course, we must bear in mind that rights protection varies across regional,
state, municipal, and class lines in Brazil and that rights are not fully guaranteed
in many circumstances.



6

Brian Wampler and Michael Touchton



social services – are less engaged with participatory institutions, have
limited formal contacts with public officials, and eschew protest activities. These organizations meet the profile of third-sector associations,
which typically provide social services through government contracts
(Bresser-Pereira and Spink 1998; Bresser-Pereira and Grau 1999; Lavalle,
Acharya, and Houtzager 2005). Third-sector CSOs tend to be nonpartisan but often leverage their professional and technical know-how to
shape and implement public policies. We anticipate the leaders of these
organizations will be able to use preexisting networks (e.g., they went to
the same high school or university) to engage public officials and to
mobilize resources.
The broad field of “social movements” includes many smaller organizations that work toward similar goals. Thus there may be, writ large,
a health “movement” or a housing “movement” that is comprised of
many CSOs. Although CSOs in such movements may come together for
specific public demonstrations or strategic planning, they have their own
political and policy agendas at the local level. CSOs themselves can also
include a range of organizational types, such as community-based organizations, service-providers, national organizations, and/or advocacy think
tanks. Our challenge is to identify these CSOs and explain their strategic
choices, given the increasing number of options at CSOs’ disposal in
Brazil.
We draw from an original survey of 863 CSO leaders across seven
Brazilian cities to create a series of statistical models of CSO activities.
We find that the combination of three factors most accurately explains
CSOs’ political/policy strategies. First, at the macrolevel, the wealth of
the city influences CSOs’ strategies. Wealthier cities have greater levels of
public resources to spend on social service contracts, a broader middle
class, and a more robust administrative structure to support the proliferation of participatory institutions. The results of our regression analyses indicate the wealth of the city has a significant effect on the strategic
actions CSOs take.
Second, at the individual level, we find that CSO leaders’ socioeconomic status also significantly affects CSOs’ strategies. In our models we
use household income as our proxy for socioeconomic status and our
central individual-level explanatory variable.2 Thus, the individual characteristics of CSO leaders are important because of the leaders’ formal and

2

Household income is highly correlated with education level (0.86) and race
(0.81).
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professional training, their personal networks, and the intangible aspects
of social status that are related to power in Brazil.
Third, at the mesolevel, we examine whether CSOs hold a contract
to deliver state services. This is a mesolevel factor because it implies that
CSOs are (a) formally registered with the state, (b) have the infrastructure and skills to provide social services, and (c) have political leaderships
that can secure government contracts. It thus falls between the individual
characteristics of CSO leadership at the microlevel and city wealth at the
macrolevel. The results of our regression analysis show that holding a
government contract also has a significant effect on CSOs’ strategic
actions.
Table 1 captures distinct patterns of CSOs’ political and policy activities. We find that the level of wealth in a CSO’s city, the level of
wealth of a CSO’s leadership, and whether a CSO has a government
service-delivery contract are strongly associated with a CSO’s political
strategy.3 The final column in Table 1 classifies the type of organizations
associated with each political strategy.
In this article we show how the protections provided by the reestablishment of democratic rule, the creation of participatory institutions,
and the expansion of the welfare state best explain why CSOs select
specific political activities to pursue their political interests. These theoretical frameworks map onto the micro-, meso-, and macrolevel causal
mechanisms we identify as crucial for explaining CSO behavior based on
variation in the CSOs and the sociopolitical context in which they operate. Although this article focuses on seven Brazilian cities, we argue that
our approach is sufficiently broad that our insights can be applied to
patterns of political organizing across the region.
The paper proceeds as follows: First, we briefly describe the expansion and changes to Brazil’s civil society during the 1980s and 1990s.
Second, we focus on the changes in the political opportunities and institutional structures that altered the terrain of civil society organizing.
Third, we present the Brazilian context, discuss our data, and describe
the strategies we use to analyze our data. Fourth, we report and discuss
our results with respect to broad debates in the field.

3

It is important to note that the cities included in the survey do not represent
the poorest parts of the country. The cities in our sample are not representative
of the largest cities in the country either.
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Table 1: Brazilian Civil Society Organizations’ Characteristics, Strategies,
and Type
CSO Characteristics

Poorer
Cities

Wealthier
Cities

Leaders have
High SES,
NO contracts
Leaders have
High SES,
Active contract
Leaders have
Low SES,
NO contracts
Leaders have
Low SES,
Active contract
Leaders have
high SES,
NO contracts
Leaders have
high SES,
Active contract
Leaders have
low SES
NO contracts
Leaders have
Low SES:
Active contract

Informal
contact with
public
officials

Participation
in formal
policymaking
processes

Involvement in
Protest
Politics

Type

8
(Lowest)

8
(Lowest)

7
(Low)

6
(Middle)

7
(Low)

8
(Lowest)

7
(Low)

2
(High)

2
(High)

Communitybased, Politically
disconnected

4
(Middle)

6
(Middle)

5
(Middle)

Communitybased, Politically
connected

5
(Middle)

3
(High)

4
(Middle)

Religious, Social,
Rights-based

1
(Highest)

5
(Middle)

6
(Middle)

Third Sector

3
(High)

1
(Highest)

1
(Highest)

Communitybased, Politically
disconnected

2
(High)

4
(Middle)

3
(High)

Communitybased, Politically
connected

Religious, Social,
Rights-based
Third Sector

Note:

The relative positions of CSOs in each column are based on cross-tabulation
of frequencies for each set of CSO characteristics and the strategies CSOs
pursue. We then rank CSOs possessing one of the eight possible combinations of character traits against each other according to how much they pursue
each political strategy. The result is a 1–8 ranking for each strategy relative to
other CSOs with different characteristics.

Source:

Authors’ own compilation.

2

Setting the Stage

Four interrelated processes best explain the heterogeneity of Brazil’s civil
society today: (i) the renewal of civil society during the 1970s and 1980s;
(ii) the creation of a new party system, especially the predominance of
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two reform-oriented parties (the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT) and the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Partido da Social
Democracia Brasileira – PSDB)) at the center of presidential contests;
(iii) the establishment of a new democratic architecture; and (iv) the
expansion of social policy provisions in the years 2000–2009, which
followed the economic stabilization of the 1990s (Kinzo 1996).
First, the renewal of civil society during the 1970s and 1980s ushered in new ways of conducting politics (Dagnino 1994 and 1998; Avritzer 2002; Dagnino and Tatagiba 2007). Specifically, the growth of new
social movements and new forms of labor organizing contributed to new
forms of engagement (Álvarez 1990; Avritzer 2002). For example, the
liberation theology movement and Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy influenced citizens to organize around demands for civil, political, and social
rights. Citizens also began to use democratic procedures within their
organizations, including deliberative processes and elections. The expansion of civil society also fostered the creation of new political alliances
and groups. These alliances potentially circumvented the clientelistic
relationships of the past and offered groups new opportunities to pursue
their interests. Furthermore, the increasing density and diversity of civil
society allowed these groups to engage public officials in unprecedented
ways (Avritzer 2002; Hochstetler and Keck 2007; Wolford 2010).
Second, the creation of a new party system, especially the growth of
two reformist political parties (the PT and the PSDB), was directly relevant in generating new forms of participation and engagement (Keck
1992; Hunter 2010). The PT not only built itself on the infrastructure of
new social movements and labor organizations but also linked itself to
progressive sectors of the middle class, thus incorporating new interests
into the PT coalition. The PSDB grew out of the Brazilian Democratic
Movement (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro – MDB) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democrático
Brasileiro – PMDB) (political parties formed in opposition to the military
dictatorship) and its original political base consisted of São Paulo’s middle classes. Thus, the two dominant political parties created in postdictatorship Brazil (occupying the presidency from 1994–2014) emerged from
an effort to reform the basic political and social institutions that govern
the country.4

4

Of course, both parties have changed their positions since the mid-1990s. The
PSDB established the highly successful economic growth model, and the PT
changed its position to be closer to the PSDB model while still focusing on social policies and redistribution.
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Third, Brazil’s establishment of a new constitutional order dramatically increased the number of citizens formally engaged with the state
(Avritzer 2009; Abers and Keck 2009). Brazil’s 1988 Constitution is a
broad, sweeping document that includes a wide range of rights and a
new distribution of authority. It offered concessions to conservative
political groups (Hagopian 1996) as well as to newly organized civil society groups (Avritzer 2002). The 1988 Constitution introduced two specific changes that are pertinent to our research: First, it mandated an
extensive municipalization of authority and resources. Second, the legislation that accompanied the new constitution required municipalities to
establish specific types of participatory institutions and permitted local
governments to experiment with other new forms of participation. As a
result, the surface area of the state broadened, thus allowing citizens a
greater number of entry points into the state (Heller and Evans 2011).
Fourth, Brazil’s economic stabilization during the 1990s and subsequent economic expansion during 2000–2009 made new revenues available and allowed the government to increase overall spending levels.
Elected officials at the federal and subnational levels also used these new
resources to expand social-service delivery. Some of the results of this
shift have been a real reduction in extreme poverty, a broadening of the
working class, and an increase in access to basic consumer goods (World
Bank 2014; UNDP 2010 and 2013). While income and asset inequality
remain quite high, economic expansion increased the middle class’s absolute wealth and created a much larger working class. Relevant to our
argument here is that economic growth created a group of professionalized CSOs, which are led by individuals with much-higher-than-average
income and education levels and represent relatively wealthy constituencies.

3

Organizing under a Democratic, Social
Welfare State

Citizens and civil society organizations, as the political opportunity literature on social movements has shown, modify their strategies in response
to changes in the social, political, or institutional environment (McAdam,
McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tilly 2004). Tarrow argues that
differences in patterns of state building produced differences in
the opportunity structures of social movements […]. Tocqueville’s
underlying message was that state-building creates an opportunity
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structure for collective action of which ordinary people take advantage (Tarrow 1998: 55–56).

We argue that the reestablishment of representative democracy, the implementation of new participatory institutions, and the expansion of
social-service spending altered the opportunity structure for political
engagement, thus inducing CSOs to utilize a wide range of activities in
pursuit of their political and policy goals.
The first analytical pillar of our argument is that the return to representative democracy was accompanied by an increased protection of
basic civil liberties, including the right to hold public demonstrations.
Political protest is an integral part of political organizing in Brazil as
excluded groups have traditionally used contentious politics as a way to
place their interests on the public agenda (Álvarez 1990; Escobar and
Álvarez 1992; Wampler 2007). As a result, an increase in public demonstrations following the democratic transition is not surprising, because
contentious politics often accompany democratic state building. In this
sense, democracy frees ordinary citizens to use disruptive, direct action
to ensure public officials and their fellow citizens hear protesters’ demands (Tarrow 1998). Politically marginalized citizens have long used
contentious politics to expand their rights, gain the attention of public
officials and their fellow citizens, and access scarce public resources.
Extensive use of contentious politics allowed new political coalitions to
develop, pushed new leaders into the centers of political power, and
highlighted the ability of outside groups to successfully promote significant institutional reform during recent transitions to and the establishment of democratic regimes during the 1980s, the 1990s, and the period
2000–2009 (Yashar 2005; Baiocchi 2005; Grindle 2002; Wampler and
Avritzer 2004; Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2011).5
The second analytical pillar of our argument is that new democratic
institutions are part of a larger democratic state-building effort designed
to overcome perceived deficiencies with representative democracy such
as passive voters with little information, the lack of accountability among
elected officials, a limited public sphere, and misallocations of scarce
public resources (Avritzer 2002; Stepan 1989; Castañeda 1993; O’Don5

The ability of citizens and CSOs to exercise these rights still varies widely
across the country as well as among different socioeconomic classes (Abers and
Keck 2013; Hochstetler and Keck 2007). Wealthier middle-class individuals
holding demonstrations in central areas of large cities have greater protection
than poorer citizens organizing protests far away from media outlets (Arias
2009). Nevertheless, Brazilian protesters are generally better protected under
the democratic regime than they were prior to the transition.
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nell 1994; Fung and Wright 2003; Wampler 2007; Barczak 2001; Pateman 1970 and 2012). Specifically, participatory institutions are designed
to enhance the quality of democracy and improve the basic delivery of
public goods to those groups historically excluded from all but the most
minimal levels of state resources (Touchton and Wampler 2014). The
establishment of participatory democracy is best conceptualized as a new
moment of democratic state building, whereby intermediary bodies are
established to further decentralize where, when, and by whom binding
decisions are made.
Democratic state-building through participatory institutions is not
uniform across Latin America or within each country due to the fragmentation of local and national states’ capacities, the diversity of rules
that guide participatory institutions, the repertories of strategies available
to CSOs, and elected officials’ interests (Goldfrank 2007; Migdal 2001;
Scott 1998; Van Cott 2008; Wampler and Avritzer 2004; Wampler 2007;
Fedozzi 2001).
In Brazil the three most common participatory institutions include
the widely established public policy management councils (conselhos),
policy conferences (confêrencias), and participatory budgeting (orçamento
participativo). There are now at least 65,000 municipal-level councils and
hundreds of thousands of elected citizens that participate in these councils (Victora et al. 2011). One-quarter of medium-sized and large municipalities continue to use participatory budgeting as a policy-making and
democratic tool. Presidents Lula and Dilma invested heavily in the national conference system, inducing more than 6 million people to participate over the past decade.
Table 2: Participatory Institutions in Brazil
Participatory
Budgeting

Numbers
100+ midsized and large
municipalities

Public Policy
Management
Councils

65,000 councils

National
conferences

74 conferences since
2002

Source:

Participants
Hundreds of
thousands
citizens engaged
Hundreds of
thousands
citizens elected
to office
6 million over
past decade

Voice
Yes

Vote
Yes

Key authority
Focus on
public works

Yes

Yes

Monitor
government
programs

Yes

PartialBroad
topics

Propose
general policy
guidelines

Authors’ own compilation.

The establishment of participatory governance is now transforming
when, where, and how contentious politics can be used, thereby encour-
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aging us to modify Tarrow’s definition of how contentious politics develop.
Collective action becomes contentious when it is used by people
who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or
unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally
challenge others or authorities (Tarrow 1998: 3. Italics added).

Although participatory institutions now provide regular institutional
access for large numbers of Brazilians, the Brazilian masses continue to
use contentious politics as part of their political engagement repertory.
This suggests that while regular access to participatory institutions increases the political opportunities available to citizens, it does not remove customary avenues of engagement.
The third analytical pillar of our argument is that Brazil’s return to a
neodevelopmentalist state was accompanied by an expansion of the
social welfare state (Montero 2014; Sugiyama 2012). Federal, state, and
municipal governments greatly expanded the number of social contracts
they were able to provide. For many Brazilian CSOs, their mantra during
the 1970s and 1980s was “autonomy,” which reflected CSOs’ efforts to
maintain a healthy distance between themselves and public officials.
Importantly, the overarching theme shifted to “partnership” or “cogovernance” during the first and second decades of the twenty-first century
as CSOs sought to align themselves with the state and elected governments in order to secure public contracts.
In terms of accessing state contracts, middle-class CSO leaders have
policy and personnel networks as well as professional skills that allow
them to gain access to the expanded public resources. Thus, a combination of meritocracy (expert knowledge), know-how (ability to provide
services and to “win” complex service-delivery contracts), and personnel
networks (ties to political appointees, elected officials, and high-level civil
servants) permits these CSOs to gain access to resources that sustain
their organizations.
Conversely, social movements and CSOs whose leaders have lower
SES must pursue a much more overtly politicized set of strategies in
order to secure funding. These CSO leaders often lack professional skills,
but instead have access to elected officials and to the poor. These CSOs
are also more likely to be susceptible to co-optation because they are
much more economically insecure than middle-class organizations.
In sum, Brazil’s current democratic regime induces civil society
leaders to play multiple formal and informal roles, acting as legislative
aides, campaign workers, service delivery providers, party activists, elected representatives in participatory institutions, and community organiz-
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ers. The boundaries between these roles are fluid, which means that in
some venues community leaders represent the state; in other venues, a
political party; and in others, the interests of their community organizations or social movements. There is now a blurring of the interests CSO
leaders purportedly represent in any given venue, which is why it is vital
to study cogovernance venues as one institutional process embedded in
broader economic and political contexts. Within democratic regimes,
especially when there are competitive local elections, the cooperation of
CSOs and public officials is widespread, making it necessary to conceptualize contentious politics as one political tool in a broader repertoire of
political strategies employed by CSOs to pursue their political, policy,
and organizing goals.

4

What Explains Connections between the
State and Civil Society?

We administered a survey to CSO leaders in seven Brazilian municipalities in 2009 and 2010 to collect data on the connections between the
state and civil society.6 One of the cities selected, Belo Horizonte, is the
state capital of Minas Gerais and has a population of roughly 2.5 million
residents. The other six cities are midsized, with populations between
100,000 and 250,000 people. We opted to study a greater number of
midsized cities because we know much less about the interactions between the state and civil society there than we know about those in the
large capital cities. These cities include Juiz De Fora, Lages, Montes
Claros, Sorocaba, Uberlândia, and Vitória Da Conquista. We limited our
sample to one southern city (Lages), one city in the state of São Paulo
(Sorocaba), one city in the state of Bahia (Vitória Da Conquista), and
three cities from the state of Minas Gerais (Juiz De Fora, Montes Claros,
Uberlândia). We selected these specific cities because they exhibit considerable variation based on wealth, regional and state politics, local party
system, and the configuration of civil society. We argue this variation
increases the chances that any relationships we find in the data using all

6

Dr. Brian Wampler worked with Dr. Leonardo Avritzer (Federal University of
Minas Gerais) to administer this survey. Financial support to administer the
survey came from multiple sources, including the Federal University of Minas
Gerais, Boise State University, the Civil Society Consortium of the University
of Massachusetts, and the Research Foundation of the State of Minas Gerais
(FAPEMIG).
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seven of these cities will reflect the average experience of many similar
Brazilian municipalities.
Our survey captures civil society leaders’ activities and attitudes.
These leaders are the crucial conduits linking the state to citizens and
CSOs in each city. First, we obtained each city’s lists of registered organizations. Then we contacted each organization and surveyed its president
or another leader. The sample is comprised entirely of CSO leaders who
are engaged in participatory organizations or civil society organizations
that register with the municipal government to remain eligible for state
contracts (convenios).7 Our survey population thus includes a wide variety
of professional organizations as well as local voluntary associations.
The survey asks questions about the structure of the CSO, its connection to the state, its connection to civil society, and the demographics
of its leadership. For example, the survey requests information regarding
whether the CSO elects or appoints its leaders, whether they have a
contract to provide services with an outside organization (e.g., the state,
a private firm, another nonprofit), how frequently the CSO meets. We
also ask questions concerning the frequency with which the CSO has
contact with local government representatives and participatory democratic institutions and about what activities the CSO pursues (e.g., street
protests, council meeting attendance). A total of 863 CSO activists responded to the survey in our seven-city sample. The resulting database
represents one of the largest, broadest cross-sectional surveys of CSOs
in Latin America and therefore offers unique opportunities to test hypotheses and examine the conventional wisdom surrounding state–civil
society relations.
We specify seven logit models with standard errors clustered on the
city to explain CSOs’ connection with the state and the form of political
participation they use to pursue their interests. In each case we present
the dependent variable from each set of models, discuss the independent
variables and our specific hypotheses connecting them to the dependent
variable, and then present the estimation results for each individual model. We report the raw coefficients for relationships between the inde7

In each city we contacted the municipal government to secure lists of CSOs
formally registered with the municipal state. CSOs are registered with the different public policy councils, the policy conferences, and with specific departments. We attempted to contact approximately 1,200 CSOs from all seven cities. We then surveyed all 863 CSOs that responded to our initial contact. In
five of the seven cities, we employed student research assistants to administer
surveys to CSO leaders in person in the leaders’ respective neighborhoods. We
administered the survey via telephone in Belo Horizonte and Lages.
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pendent and dependent variable and include the odds ratio for each
variable in the Technical Appendix (see Tables 3a–7a). We construct the
first set of models to answer questions about whether CSOs have contact with municipal councils, legislative assemblies, and/or members of
the mayor’s cabinet.

4.1 Dependent Variable 1: Contact with the State
Our data captures the range of contact CSOs had with municipal, state,
and federal institutions in the form of participatory democratic institutions, the municipal legislative council, the state legislature, and the
mayor’s office for the two months prior to responding to the survey. We
use the responses to generate four dichotomous variables with scores of
1 indicating that participation or contact has occurred and 0 indicating
that it has not. Out of the entire sample, 77 percent of CSOs attended
participatory council meetings, 65 percent attended national conferences,
48 percent contacted the municipal legislature, and 63 percent contacted
the mayor’s office.
We use CSO leaders’ formal participation in state institutions and
informal contact with different government officials to measure overall
engagement between the state and civil society. Explaining the frequency
with which CSO leaders participate in formal policy-making bodies and
contact different branches of the state can help us understand the motivation behind CSO activities and also provides an indication of the current configuration of state–civil society relations in Brazil.

4.2 Key Independent Variable: The City’s Wealth
We first want to know whether a city’s wealth accounts for CSOs’ political activities. We hypothesize that CSOs in relatively wealthy cities are
likely to engage the state less than CSOs in relatively poor cities, thus
revealing a wealth dimension to clientelistic exchanges. For instance,
CSOs in poorer municipalities rely on state institutions and public and
party officials to secure scarce resources in order to help their community members get access to basic services. In contrast, CSOs in wealthy
municipalities have more resources, are more professionalized, and have
more connections with civil society than in poorer cities. They will therefore find it less necessary to rely on the state for support. Though state
support may offer benefits, it may also carry a cost that CSOs in wealthier cities do not need to pay.
We use the log of each municipality’s local GDP/capita as the first
proxy for access to resources. We recognize, however, that this is an
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incomplete proxy for the wealth of a CSO’s membership or the resources CSOs themselves might have. Brazilian cities feature populations
representing diverse economic experiences. Wealthy cities contain many
poor neighborhoods and poor cities contain wealthy neighborhoods.
Accounting for the particular submunicipal context in which a CSO
operates is important to assess whether a CSO’s relative wealth impacts
its behavior. We therefore use the household income of the survey respondents as an additional proxy for our CSOs’ economic contexts.
Although this measure provides more refined information about CSOs’
submunicipal economic environments, it still requires two different assumptions about the CSO leaders’ household incomes. First, we assume
that leaders with higher incomes are associated with “professional” or
third-sector NGOs and thus work on behalf of an issue or community
without necessarily being a potential recipient of the public good. Second, we assume that low-income respondents are working with a “community-based organization” in which they seek to secure public goods
that would directly benefit their communities.

4.3 Key Independent Variable:
The CSO Administrator’s Household Income
We collect data on the monthly household income of each CSO administrator that responded to our surveys. This variable takes on the values of
different salary bands corresponding to the following monthly household
income levels: (1) up to USD 250, (2) USD 251 to USD 500, (3) USD
501 to USD 1,000, (4) USD 1,001 to USD 1,750, (5) USD 1,751 to USD
2,650, and (6) above USD 2,651. Our data show that 16 percent fall
within salary band 1; 22 percent, in band 2; 34 percent, in band 3; 12
percent, in band 4; 8 percent, in band 5; and 8 percent, in band 6.

4.4 Control Variables
The Mayor’s Party: New forms of democratic participation and the
strengthening of civil society have been the centerpiece of the PT’s national agenda over the last decade. PT mayors and CSOs often share a
pro-poor bias and are thus likely to cooperate at greater rates, on average, than CSOs and non-PT mayors. Furthermore, poorer populations
targeted by CSOs and the PT are almost always disengaged from politics.
Incorporating the poor and politically disengaged into the city’s policymaking architecture would theoretically increase the likelihood of poorer
citizens voting in city elections. These new voters would most likely vote
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for left-wing parties who propose downward redistribution of city revenue. Conventional wisdom therefore suggests that left-wing mayors
would champion CSO programs not only because their downwardly
redistributive, poverty reducing policy platforms are popular with many
CSOs, but also because they want to bring new left-wing voters to the
polls.
In general, we expect PT mayors to have greater opportunities to
support state-society interaction and CSO engagement than non-PT
mayors both through resources from the national government and the
party and through a greater motivation to align with ideological policy.
We anticipate CSOs in municipalities with PT mayors will have greater
interaction with the state, will be more likely to elect their leaders than
CSOs operating in municipalities with non-PT mayors, and will be less
likely to use protest as a form of political participation. If the “protest”
part of our assumption is correct, it suggests that the PT’s longtime base
will change their political strategies when the PT is in power, thus raising
the likelihood of co-optation. We use a dichotomous variable to test
whether CSOs in municipalities with PT mayors (coded 1; accounts for
percent) behave systematically differently from CSOs in municipalities
with non-PT mayors (coded 0; accounts for 54 percent).

4.5 Whether CSOs Hold Government Contracts
We collect data on whether CSOs are contracted to provide services for
an external entity. This entity is almost always one tier of Brazil’s federal
system, but it could also be a foreign government, a domestic charitable
organization, or an international nonprofit – even the Catholic Church.
We hypothesize that CSOs with state contracts are likely to have
more interaction with the state due to such contracts. We also think that
CSOs with government contracts are less likely to protest against the
state; this may be due to having a contract with the state in some cases,
but may also be due to the professionalization that comes with having a
contract to provide services. The direct responsibilities to fulfill contracts
become relatively more important compared to some of the CSOs’ other
long-term missions. For example, a contract creates a financial incentive
to focus on providing services and may not leave time for political protest. Simply put, a contract for service delivery can transform CSOs from
crusaders into managers. Furthermore, CSOs that receive contracts are
likely to be the most professionalized and the most focused on service
delivery and are most likely to pursue their missions through means
beyond public protests in the first place.
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We employ a dichotomous variable to ascertain whether CSOs are
under contract (coded 1; accounts for 46 percent) or not (coded 0; accounts for 54 percent).

4.6 Whether the CSO Elects its Leadership
We expect CSOs’ organizational structure to impact their contact with
the state and their form of political participation. Broadly speaking, some
CSOs elect their leaders, whereas others appoint them from their membership. Elected leaders may have different incentives driving their behavior than appointed leaders. For example, an elected leader may have a
strong incentive to mobilize CSO membership for a protest because
public protest is a highly visible way to demonstrate a leader’s commitment to action on behalf of the organization. Additionally, organizations
that elect their leaders may have a natural affinity with democratically
elected state representatives. These similarities may lead to greater contact between CSOs with elected leaders and the state than between CSOs
with appointed leaders and the state. Similarly, elected CSO leaders may
be ambitious and interested in using their positions to network with
public officials, gain experience with the state, and/or expand their career opportunities. Finally, internal CSO elections allow ordinary participants to hold their leaders accountable, as candidates for CSO leadership
positions must demonstrate their engagement in a variety of policy venues – possibly beyond protest activities.
To test these hypotheses, we use a dichotomous variable to determine whether CSOs elect their leaders (coded 1; accounts for 14 percent)
or appoint their leaders (coded 0; accounts for 86 percent).

4.7 Contact with Other State Entities
We anticipate that CSOs inclined to work with one state entity will have
a greater chance of contacting and attempting to work with another state
entity. This may occur if a CSO’s initial state contact does not produce
the expected outcomes, thus leading the CSO to solicit help from another state entity or patron. The CSO could also pursue contacts with multiple state entities at once to generate better outcomes as a client or
simply because the first state entity is not able to resolve a CSO’s problem or provide it with a service.
We code a variable that measures the number of state entities a
CSO reports having had contact with during the six months prior to our
survey (not including the branch of the state for the DV in Tables 3 and
4). The minimum amount of contact is 0 and the maximum is 5. The
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mean number of entities with which CSOs interact is 1.57 and the standard deviation is 0.46.
Table 3: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the
State in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010
Independent
Variables

Per Capita GDP
(Logged)
Mayor’s Party
CSO Contract
Elected Leaders
Contact with
Other Parts of
the State
Constant
Log Likelihood
Wald X2 (4)
N
Pseudo R2
Note:

Coeff. for
Attending a
Policy Council Meeting
(SE)
-0.24**
(0.00)
-0.51
(0.29)
0.68**
(0.11)
0.10*
(0.04)

Coeff. for
Attending a
National
Conference
(SE)
-0.20**
(0.03)
-0.39
(0.33)
0.76**
(0.08)
0.13*
(0.05)

Coeff. for
Contact with
Municipal
Chamber
(SE)
-0.19**
(0.02)
-0.44
(0.35)
0.55**
(0.10)
0.02**
(0.001)

Coeff. for
Contact with
Mayor’s
Cabinet
(SE)
-0.18**
(0.0005)
-0.37
(0.31)
0.74**
(0.03)
0.13**
(0.03)

0.17**
(0.04)

0.17**
(0.03)

0.19*
(0.08)

0.18**
(0.04)

1.37
(0.74)
-316.49
163
840
0.34

2.15**
(0.62)
-274.07
167
823
0.26

1.66
(0.79)
-288.61
164
854
0.29

1.30*
(0.38)
-301.93
164
825
0.39

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 4: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the
State in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010 (Using CSO Administrators’ Household Incomes)
Independent
Variables

Administrator’s
Household
Income
Mayor’s Party
CSO Contract
Elected Leaders
Contact with
Other Parts of
the State
Constant

Coeff. for
Attending a
Policy Council Meeting
(SE)

Coeff. for
Attending a
National
Conference
(SE)

Coeff. for
Contact with
Municipal
Chamber
(SE)

Coeff. for
Contact with
Mayor’s
Cabinet
(SE)

-0.35**
(0.07)

-0.27**
(0.05)

-0.25**
(0.03)

-0.37**
(0.06)

-0.49
(0.29)
0.59**
(0.10)
0.03**
(0.01)

-0.46
(0.28)
0.64**
(0.06)
0.21**
(0.03)

-0.45
(0.29)
0.61**
(0.10)
0.04**
(0.01)

-0.25
(0.18)
0.64**
(0.12)
0.13 **
(0.02)

0.19*
(0.08)

0.18**
(0.04)

0.23**
(0.05)

0.21*
(0.09)

1.20
(0.85)

1.73
(0.87)

1.41
(0.90)

1.44*
(0.67)



Independent
Variables

Log Likelihood
Wald X2 (4)
N
Pseudo R2
Note:
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Coeff. for
Attending a
Policy Council Meeting
(SE)
-308.83
167
851
0.33

Coeff. for
Attending a
National
Conference
(SE)
-325.37
168
836
0.27

Coeff. for
Contact with
Municipal
Chamber
(SE)
-296.48
166
853
0.26

Coeff. for
Contact with
Mayor’s
Cabinet
(SE)
-319.27
160
848
0.31

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

4.8 Results for Formal Policy Making, Informal contact
with state officials as Dependent Variables
First, the results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that both formal and informal
CSO contact with participatory democracy decreases as the city in which
CSOs are located gets wealthier. Similarly, CSO engagement with the
state decreases as CSO administrator household income increases. The
direction of these relationships is consistent across model specifications
and statistically significant in each case. The relationships hold for CSO
contact with other branches of the state as well: the odds of CSOs having recent contact with public officials decrease as city wealth and CSO
administrator household income increase – in some cases, by almost 40
percent per unit increase. This suggests that compared to CSOs from
municipalities with a mean level of logged GDP/capita, those with
logged GDP/capita of one standard deviation above the mean are estimated to have on average up to 32 percent less contact with the state
when holding all other variables constant at their means. This finding
provides support for the resource mobilization argument: CSOs become
less dependent on the state as the wealth of their community grows
(Buechler 1993; Jenkins 1983).
Second, the results in Tables 3 and 4 show that CSOs with elected
leaders are more likely to have contact with participatory democracy and
other state entities than are CSOs with appointed leaders. This is important because it suggests that CSO members expect leaders to show
evidence of their organizations’ progress and represent members’ interests to the state. The willingness of elected CSO leaders to interact with
the state (controlling for the CSO leaders’ SES) might reflect high expectations and accountability as CSO leaders who fail to showcase their
efforts through interaction with the state may be voted out of office.
This is updated evidence for the “participatory publics” argument, which
draws attention to the use of democratic practices inside of CSOs (Avritzer 2002; Wampler and Avritzer 2004).
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Third, the results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate having a contract increases the likelihood of contact with the state by approximately five
times relative to organizations without a contract. This suggests that
contracts not only provide CSOs with payments for services but also
create and strengthen connections between the state and civil society.
We create an interaction term for CSO leaders’ income and for whether
the CSO has a state contract. The results of the estimation presented in
Table 5 show that CSOs with relatively wealthy leaders and state contracts are more likely to engage with the state than are CSOs with only
wealthy leaders.
Table 5: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the
State in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010 (Using an Interaction between CSO Administrators’ Household Incomes and State
Contracts)
Independent
Variables

Administrator’s
Household Income
*Contract (Conditional Coeff. for
High Income, with
contract)
Administrator’s
Income
CSO Contract
Mayor’s Party
Elected Leaders
Contact with Other
Parts of the State
Constant
Log Likelihood
Wald X2 (4)
N
Pseudo R2
Note:

Coeff. for
Attending a
Policy Council Meeting
(SE)

Coeff. for
Attending a
National
Conference
(SE)

Coeff. for
Contact with
Municipal
Chamber
(SE)

Coeff. for
Contact with
Mayor’s
Cabinet
(SE)

-0.11**
(0.02)

-0.18**
(0.03)

-0.16**
(0.04)

-0.20**
(0.03)

-0.31
(0.22)
0.73**
(0.18)
-0.09
(0.13)
0.06**
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
1.58*
(0.70)
-341.85
170
843
0.34

-0.25
(0.20)
0.70**
(0.16)
-0.11
(0.10)
0.04*
(0.02)
-0.06
(0.04)
1.70*
(0.74)
-310.50
177
839
0.36

-0.46*
(0.22)
0.62**
(0.18)
-0.06
(0.10)
0.03*
(0.01)
-0.04*
(0.02)
1.94
(1.36)
-328.73
164
851
0.38

-0.20
(0.18)
0.87**
(0.21)
-0.17
(0.15)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.01
(0.01)
1.15*
(0.39)
-274.09
168
851
0.42

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

We also evaluate CSO assessments of learning following state contact
and participation in state institutions. The results in Table 5a of the
Technical Appendix help corroborate some of our arguments about
wealth and CSOs’ reliance on the state. CSOs from wealthier cities and
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with wealthier administrators are less likely to feel that attending educational workshops is beneficial than are CSOs in poorer cities and with
poorer leaders. Thus the CSOs with potentially fewer resources have
more contact with the state and they express satisfaction with regard to
that contact – at least in the form of claiming to have gained beneficial
knowledge of how government works by attending workshops. In contrast, CSOs with potentially more resources are, on average, less likely to
have contact with the state and less likely to find that contact beneficial
in terms of workshops.
Our data reveals a general trend where CSOs in wealthier cities and
with wealthier leaders are distant from formal politics. It appears that
wealthier CSOs already have the resources, knowledge, and connections
to pursue their interests without relying on the state. CSOs in wealthy
areas and with wealthy leaders are likely to be more professionalized and
perhaps have organizational advantages, which means that they do not
need the state as much as CSOs in poorer cities and with poorer leaders
do. However, the relationships we find in the data could also stem from
state officials’ attempts to shield themselves and their agencies from
pressure. Under this conceptual framework public officials might reasonably expect CSOs with more resources to make greater demands,
deploy greater resources, and use greater connections in government to
pursue their interests compared to CSOs with relatively fewer options.
Interactions with well-resourced CSOs may therefore present public
officials with more political trouble than benefits.

5

Forms of Participation: What Explains
Public Protests?

Finally, we assess what drives CSOs to participate in public demonstrations. Public demonstrations represent a visible but blunt form of political participation. Mass protest can also potentially have an outsize impact
relative to its cost due to the high visibility of demonstrations and the
large voting blocs the poor represent in Brazil, where other forms of
participation are relatively closed to poorer citizens.

5.1 Dependent Variable: CSO Participation in Protests
We collect data on whether CSOs organized or participated in a public
demonstration in the previous six months. The variable is coded 1 if
such participation occurred in the six months prior to the survey (42
percent of CSOs) and 0 if it did not (58 percent of CSOs) did not. We
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specify two additional models to identify the determinants of protest
participation among CSOs.

5.2 Key Independent Variable: Wealth of Cities and
CSO Administrators
Citizens and CSOs in poorer cities are likely to rely on the state more
than CSOs in wealthier cities. As a result, politicians may be vulnerable
to public pressure because their ability to retain office in these cities
often depends on maintaining majority support of the poor – the largest
group of Brazilian voters. CSOs in poorer cities or communities will
therefore be more likely to use public protest to participate and to put
political pressure on the state than CSOs in wealthier cities and communities. However, CSOs in poor cities, whose leaders have low SES, may
protest because they lack other means to express their grievances, not
necessarily because they are more dependent on public services. Our
point here is that much like with CSO-state interaction above, more
professional CSOs have different ways of engaging public officials and
do not need to use mass protest to achieve their goals.
Table 6: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Participation in
Protests in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010
Independent Variables
Per Capita GDP (Logged)

Coefficient (SE)
-0.46**
(0.01)

Administrator’s Household Income
Mayor’s Party
CSO Contract
Elected Leaders
Contact with the State
Constant
Log Likelihood
Wald X2 (4)
N
Pseudo R2
Note:

0.06
(0.05)
-0.12**
(0.03)
0.11*
(0.05)
-0.05**
(0.01)
2.18**
(0.36)
-310.53
173
839
0.34

Coefficient (SE)

-0.22**
(0.01)
0.05
(0.05)
-0.15**
(0.03)
0.07*
(0.03)
-0.09**
(0.01)
2.33**
(0.29)
-321.78
162
824
0.36

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

We find several important connections between CSOs’ characteristics
and their likelihood of protesting. First, the probability of protesting
decreases as city wealth and CSO leader household income increase. This
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is similar to our finding with regard to contact with the state, in the sense
that CSOs with access to more resources do not need to use public
demonstrations to pursue their goals. Relatively well-resourced CSOs
may see such protests as inefficient types of political participation and
use them only as a last resort when its resources, knowledge base, and
connections fail. In contrast, CSOs in poorer cities and with poorer
leaders may have fewer options and may thus find protests attractive due
to the attention they generate and the familiarity they have with this form
of participation. Our results draw connections between wealth, contact
with the state, and participation in protests. The implication is that CSOs
in poorer cities are still using one of two strategies that have maintained
them for decades: protest or clientelism (Roniger 2004). These organizations have not abandoned political contestation, because it remains a
viable means for them to pressure the state and because the new democratic institutions may not be working as well as they should be.
Second, we find that CSOs with contracts are less likely to protest
than are CSOs without contracts. This provides added support for the
argument that CSOs in the poorer cities still use protest or clientelism.
The results also suggest that civil society has undergone a process of
professionalization and that the state has possibly co-opted CSOs
through the offer contracts, as CSOs with contracts are engaged in participatory democratic institutions, not street protests.
The government contract and wealth variables let us assess whether
wealth, professionalization, or co-optation drives CSO strategies with
regard to political participation. We interact CSO administrator household income with CSO contract to determine whether wealthy CSOs
with contracts are less likely to protest than (i) CSOs with poor leaders
and contracts, (ii) CSOs with poor leaders but without contracts, (iii) or
CSOs with wealthy leaders but without contracts. The model below
allows us to generate estimates for different configurations of CSO administrator household income and CSO contracts.
CSOs with relatively wealthy leaders and contracts are less likely to
protest than (i) CSOs with poor leaders and contracts, (ii) CSOs with
wealthy leaders but without contracts, and (iii) CSOs with poor leaders
but without contracts. This provides some evidence of professionalization, rather than of co-optation in terms of contracts, likely CSO resources, and participation in protests. CSOs whose administrators have
household incomes one standard deviation above the mean and who
have state contracts are the least likely to have attended a protest, all else
being equal.
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Table 7: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven
Brazilian Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010)
Independent
Variables

Contract*Administrator’s
Household Income (logged)
Administrator’s
Household Income (logged)
Mayor’s Party
CSO Contract
Contact with the
State
Elected Leaders
Constant
Log Likelihood
Wald X2 (4)
N
Pseudo R2
Note:

Uncond.
Coeff.
(SE)

High
Income,
Contract

High
Income,
No Contract

Low
Income,
Contract

Low
Income,
No Contract

-0.76 **
(0.10)

-0.84**
(0.05)

-0.04
(0.05)

-0.06
(0.04)

-0.08
(0.05)

-0.05
(0.04)

0.03
(0.04)

0.09
(0.08)
0.05
(0.03)
0.10
(0.06)
0.21
(0.15)
1.07 **
(0.22)
-285.30
154
817
0.37

0.10
(0.07)
0.04
(0.04)
0.06
(0.04)
0.17
(0.14)
0.51
(0.55)
-271.06
133
143
0.45

-0.05*
(0.02)
-0.03
(0.04)
-0.08*
(0.04)
0.09*
(0.04)
1.45*
(0.63)
-254.93
147
215
0.34

0.06
(0.05)
-0.06
(0.04)
0.11
(0.08)
-0.04*
(0.02)
0.66
(0.48)
-307.21
149
120
0.32

0.07*
(0.03)
-0.05
(0.03)
-0.06*
(0.02)
0.25*
(0.10)
1.59*
(0.51)
-312.75
169
339
0.51

-0.65**
(0.03)

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

CSOs whose administrators’ incomes are one standard deviation above
the mean but do not have state contracts are the next least likely to have
attended a protest. CSOs with relatively poor administrators but that
have contracts are the next least likely to protest, which is a 16 percent
lower probability than the CSOs most likely to protest – those without
contracts and with relatively poor administrators. The diminished likelihood of political protest by poorer CSOs with contracts suggests that
state co-optation may also be present in Brazil’s new participatory environment.

6

Robustness Checks

We perform a series of robustness checks to assess the stability of our
results and thoroughly test our hypotheses.8 First, we create new interaction terms to assess whether the mayor’s party exerts a different level of
influence on relatively wealthy CSOs compared to relatively poor CSOs.
8

These models are available in the Technical Appendix.
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None of these interaction terms have a statistical impact on CSOs’ interaction with the state or the likelihood of CSOs participating in a protest.
We also assess whether a left-leaning council majority influences the
behavior of CSOs by coding a variable to indicate a left-leaning council
majority relative to a non-left-leaning council majority – again with no
results. This implies the mayor’s party has little impact on CSO behavior
in our sample – no matter how we construct the variables in our models.
We also use CSO administrator education levels as a proxy for CSO
memberships’ relative education and wealth to check our primary models’ measures. CSOs’ frequency of state contact and protest decrease as
the respondent’s education increases. Our results for all models thus
remain broadly similar with or without professional CSOs in the dataset.
Finally, the low correlations among the independent variables in Table 8
of the Technical Appendix suggest there are no concerns about multicollinearity in our models.9

7

Conclusions

This article captures how Brazil’s recent political reforms frame the interactions between the state and civil society. The extension of civil liberties protection under representative democracy, the establishment of
participatory institutions, and the growth of state services provided by
CSOs all influence how Brazilian CSOs engage with the state. Our results reflect politics throughout Latin America, where civil society organization has expanded among poor and middle-class communities (Oxhorn 2011; Schönwälder 2010). Democratization, institutional reform,
and the growth of the middle class offers CSOs new opportunities to
pursue their interests in ways distinct from earlier civil society mobilizations under authoritarian governments (Fox 1996; Rueschemeyer, Huber
Stephens, and Stephens 1992). In this case, Brazilian civil society has
been “thickening” over the last 20 years as it has been in many other
middle-income Latin American democracies, such as Argentina (Friedman and Hochstetler 2002), Chile (Oxhorn 1995), Colombia (Romero
2002; Hurtado, Kawachi, and Sudarsky 2011), Costa Rica (Carneiro,
Matos, and Husted 2015), Mexico (Haynes 2013), and Uruguay (Burt,
Amilivia, and Lessa 2013). CSOs in these countries now have new opportunities, which are also likely conditioned by their particular representational environment – as Friedman and Hochstetler found in their
comparison of Brazil and Argentina (2002).
9

Our variables’ variance inflation factors (VIFs) are all under 5 as well.



28

Brian Wampler and Michael Touchton



Our empirical findings suggest that in Brazil CSOs in poor cities
and those in wealthy cities but with low-income leaders pursue a combination of direct contact with public officials, participatory democracy,
and contentious demonstrations. CSOs from relatively poor cities and
with relatively poor leaders engage with the state at greater rates than
CSOs in relatively rich areas and with richer leaders even though conventional wisdom suggests they would not do so (White 1999; Lavalle,
Acharya, and Houtzager 2005). This set of results reflects scholarship on
contentious politics in a new moment, where the state is newly and heavily involved in the political life of the poor (Tarrow 1998). Direct involvement in new democratic institutions does not decrease the likelihood of direct action (protests and contentious activities). Rather, it
relies on government contracts (outsourcing), which has the larger effect
of decreasing CSOs’ likelihood of using protest as a political strategy.
Our results also suggest that CSOs in wealthier cities and with
wealthier leaders are evolving into third-sector organizations that provide
services or distance themselves from the state as private financial resources become more prevalent through economic growth. This finding
illuminates the importance of opportunities within Brazil’s neodevelopmentalist state, which leads middle-class CSO participants to use their
expert knowledge and technical skills to engage public officials in new
ways rather than resorting to contentious politics. CSOs in poorer communities are not necessarily abandoning clientelism or contentious politics, but they are moving beyond a narrow set of choices in order to
pursue their interests. Although the state has expanded and engages with
the poor in some areas, the poor continue to seek the state out to make
their voice heard and gain voting power at the same time.
Finally, these results support scholarship on the reconfiguration of
civil society in Latin America following democratization (Brysk 2000;
Booth and Richard 1998; Wampler and Avritzer 2004). New repertories
of political action are now available to CSOs, including involvement in
party politics, campaigns and elections, incremental policy making, contentious politics, and economic boycotts, inter alia. Opportunities to
engage in collective action are more readily available in the current democratic environment, especially in comparison to the extreme difficulties
experienced under military dictatorships. New challenges for collective
action correspond to the broad diversity of activities CSOs find necessary to achieve their goals. For instance, CSOs must mobilize citizens,
engage in incremental policy making, work on campaigns and elections
(but not get too close to party officials), and develop broader social and
policy networks. Achieving these goals has gained relevance in recent
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decades as CSOs build stronger connections between democratic states
and society. Understanding how and why CSOs build these connections
is thus critical to understanding how democracy works – particularly at
the local level. We argue that Brazilian CSO strategies depend on the
interaction between a political community’s wealth, the protection of
basic civil liberties, the proliferation of new democratic institutions, and
the outsourcing of state contracts. In this respect, our research describes
and explains important connections between Brazilian democracy and
civil society. It also provides a framework for exploring these connections elsewhere in Latin America and, potentially, around the world.
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Contratante, contestando, e cooptação: Estratégias de Organizações da Sociedade Civil sob novos regimes institucionais
Resumo: A sociedade civil aumentou nos últimos 30 anos na América
Latina num processo paralelo a construção das regimes democráticas. As
organizações da sociedade civil (OSCs) são, frequentemente, colocados
como uma opção para promover as melhorias na governança, na controle social e na aumenta do capital social. Mas, temos um conhecimento
limitado sobre o que motiva as estratégias políticas das OSCs, que incluem a participação em instituições políticas formais, atendendo manifestações, e prestação de serviços. Neste artigo, nós estamos contribuindo ao
conhecimento sobre sociedade civil baseado numa pesquisa de novecentos OSCs em sete cidades brasileiras. No artigo, nos mostramos vários
processos paralelos: As OSCs mais pobres continuam a participar ativamente em varios processos políticos, incluindo as instituições participativas, as campanhas eleitoras e na politica de protestas portanto, Também
argumentamos que a retirada das OSC relativamente ricas reflete uma
maior mobilização de recursos, mais profissionalização, e um aumento
do capital social que e’ independente das novas instituições participativas. Nossos resultados mostram que as explicações de várias camadas
melhoram a nossa compreensão do comportamento das OSCs e estadosociedade relações no Brasil e na América Latina.
Palavras chaves: Brasil, a sociedade civil, a participação, os movimentos
sociais, a reforma institucional, a democratização
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Technical Appendix
Table 3a: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the State in
Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. This table presents the Odds Ratios for each
dependent variable.
Independent
Variables

Per Capita GDP
(Logged)
Mayor’s Party
CSO Contract
Elected Leaders
Contact with
Other Parts of
the State
Note:

Odds Ratio for
Attending a
Policy Council
Meeting
(SE)
0.78**
(0.00)
0.56
(0.29)
5.15**
(0.68)
1.07**
(0.11)

Odds Ratio
for Attending
a National
Conference
(SE)
0.81**
(0.03)
0.74
(0.33)
6.24**
(0.33)
1.15*
(0.08)

Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Municipal Chamber
(SE)
0.92**
(0.02)
0.62
(0.35)
4.23**
(0.59)
1.001**
(0.10)

Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Mayor’s
Cabinet
(SE)
0.91**
(0.0005)
0.74
(0.31)
6.10**
(0.47)
1.14**
(0.03)

1.28**
(0.04)

1.28**
(0.03)

1.36*
(0.08)

1.24**
(0.04)

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

PT mayors may privilege the expansion of civil society relative to mayors from other
parties and may therefore encourage CSO-state interaction and promote CSO contracts among wealthy and poor CSOs. We want to know if CSOs in relatively wealthy
cities with PT mayors have more interaction with the state than under other political
circumstances. Similarly, we want to know if CSOs in relatively poor cities protest
less when the mayor is from the PT (and thus potentially supports pro-poor policies)
than when there is a non-PT mayor in office. Table 3a.1 presents the results of estimation using these variables.
Table 3a.1: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the State in
Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. This table presents the results of adding an
interaction term to Model 1 to determine whether PT mayors in wealthy municipalities have more interaction with the state. We find no statistical connection between
PT mayors interacted with city wealth and contact with the state.
Independent
Variables

Mayor’s Party*
Administrator’s
Income (Logged)
Mayor’s Party
Per Capita GDP
(Logged)
CSO Contract

Odds Ratio
for Attending
a City Council Meeting
(SE)

Odds Ratio
for Attending
a National
Conference
(SE)

Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Municipal Chamber
(SE)

Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Mayor’s
Cabinet
(SE)

1.06
(0.22)

1.05
(0.21)

0.96
(0.30)

1.16
(0.31)

0.81
(0.05)
1.34*
(0.04)
4.01**
(0.23)

0.85
(0.21)
1.37*
(0.15)
5.16**
(0.40)

0.65
(0.20)
1.31**
(0.07)
3.98**
(0.77)

1.11
(0.13)
1.46*
(0.18)
5.38**
(0.59)
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Elected Leaders
Contact with
Other Parts of
the State
Constant
Log Likelihood
Wald X2 (4)
N
Pseudo R2
Note:
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Odds Ratio
for Attending
a City Council Meeting
(SE)
1.13*
(0.15)

Odds Ratio
for Attending
a National
Conference
(SE)
1.10*
(0.29)

Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Municipal Chamber
(SE)
1.09**
(0.19)

Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Mayor’s
Cabinet
(SE)
1.05**
(0.33)

1.26**
(0.16)

1.20**
(0.14)

1.41*
(0.25)

1.27**
(0.13)

1.25
(0.72)
-283.70
160
855
0.35

2.15
(0.67)
-307.43
168
849
0.31

1.79**
(0.24)
-264.36
155
854
0.39

1.34
(0.51)
-321.92
159
830
0.34

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 3a.2: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the State in
Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. We also assess the above possibilities using a
variable recording a left-leaning council majority vs. a non-left leaning council majority. We find no statistically significant results using this variable.
Independent
Variables

Council Partisanship*Administrator’s Household Income
(Logged)
Council Partisanship
Administrator’s
Income
CSO Contract
Elected Leaders
Contact with
Other Parts of
the State
Constant
Log Likelihood
Wald X2 (4)
N
Pseudo R2
Note:

Odds Ratio
for Attending
a City Council Meeting
(SE)

Odds Ratio
for Attending
a National
Conference
(SE)

Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Municipal Chamber
(SE)

Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Mayor’s
Cabinet
(SE)

1.08
(0.21)

1.01
(0.21)

0.97
(0.25)

1.06
(0.18)

0.79
(0.25)
1.10**
(0.18)
4.37**
(0.48)
1.17**
(0.20)

0.82
(0.36)
1.09*
(0.30)
6.26**
(0.31)
1.14**
(0.29)

0.85
(0.34)
1.10**
(0.17)
4.92*
(0.60)
1.08**
(0.26)

0.71
(0.30)
1.08**
(0.21)
5.68**
(0.54)
1.19*
(0.33)

1.13**
(0.15)

1.12**
(0.13)

1.17**
(0.05)

1.14**
(0.06)

1.41
(0.45)
-290.14
169
843
0.30

2.09
(0.38)
-315.29
173
850
0.24

1.52
(0.62)
-288.74
177
847
0.29

1.35
(0.21)
-303.67
173
852
0.30

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.
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Table 3a.3: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the State in
Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. We substitute the administrator’s level of
education for their salary and use it in otherwise-identical models of CSO interaction
with the state. Results are similar to those obtained using our primary models.
Independent
Variables

Administrator’s
Education
Mayor’s Party
CSO Contract
Elected Leaders
Contact with
Other Parts of
the State
Constant
Log Likelihood
Wald X2 (4)
N
Pseudo R2
Note:

Odds Ratio
for Attending
a City Council Meeting
(SE)
0.89**
(0.04)
0.55
(0.28)
5.07**
(0.65)
1.07**
(0.29)

Odds Ratio
for Attending
a National
Conference
(SE)
0.84**
(0.05)
0.72
(0.31)
5.93**
(0.37)
1.09*
(0.28)

Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Municipal Chamber
(SE)
0.85**
(0.05)
0.67
(0.43)
4.69**
(0.62)
1.02**
(0.24)

Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Mayor’s
Cabinet
(SE)
0.81**
(0.09)
0.68
(0.35)
5.85**
(0.40)
1.08**
(0.17)

1.41**
(0.11)

1.26**
(0.14)

1.37*
(0.35)

1.32**
(0.28)

1.48
(0.65)
-296.91
160
851
0.27

1.77
(0.80)
-322.15
166
830
0.22

1.52
(0.83)
-313.02
161
836
0.31

1.31
(0.47)
-326.57
162
833
0.30

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 3a.4: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the State in
Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. Our results for all models remain broadly
similar with or without professional CSOs in the dataset. This table presents the
results of estimation without professional CSOs in the dataset.
Independent
Variables

Per Capita GDP
(Logged)
Mayor’s Party
CSO Contract
Elected Leaders
Contact with
Other Parts of
the State
Constant
Log Likelihood
Wald X2 (4)

Odds Ratio
for Attending
a City Council Meeting
(SE)
0.83**
(0.05)
0.64
(0.27)
4.55**
(0.46)
1.16**
(0.31)

Odds Ratio
for Attending
a National
Conference
(SE)
0.82**
(0.01)
0.57
(0.36)
6.13**
(0.31)
1.10*
(0.31)

Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Municipal Chamber
(SE)
0.85**
(0.07)
0.63
(0.47)
4.75**
(0.69)
1.13**
(0.24)

Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Mayor’s
Cabinet
(SE)
0.81**
(0.03)
0.60
(0.35)
5.81**
(0.27)
1.03**
(0.34)

1.21**
(0.09)

1.23**
(0.15)

1.41*
(0.20)

1.45**
(0.12)

1.42
(0.78)
-301.83
169

1.91
(0.32)*
-310.53
179

1.47
(0.44)
-327.04
173

1.25
(0.58)
-315.49
172
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Variables

N
Pseudo R2
Note:
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Odds Ratio
for Attending
a City Council Meeting
(SE)
693
0.34

Odds Ratio
for Attending
a National
Conference
(SE)
687
0.30

Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Municipal Chamber
(SE)
661
0.41



Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Mayor’s
Cabinet
(SE)
682
0.32

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 4a: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the State in
Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010(Using CSO administrators’ household incomes). This table presents the odds ratios for each dependent variable.
Independent
Variables

Odds Ratio
for Attending
a Policy
Council
Meeting
(SE)

Odds Ratio
for Attending
a National
Conference
(SE)

Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Municipal Chamber
(SE)

Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Mayor’s
Cabinet
(SE)

0.69**
(0.07)

0.75**
(0.05)

0.71**
(0.03)

0.64**
(0.06)

0.60
(0.29)
4.67**
(0.10)
1.02**
(0.01)

0.56
(0.28)
5.02**
(0.06)
1.10**
(0.03)

0.53
(0.29)
4.86**
(0.10)
1.03**
(0.01)

0.80
(0.18)
5.06**
(0.12)
1.09**
(0.02)

0.10**
(0.08)

1.16**
(0.04)

1.19**
(0.05)

1.16*
(0.09)

Administrator’s
Household
Income
Mayor’s Party
CSO Contract
Elected Leaders
Contact with
Other Parts of
the State
Note:

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 4a.1: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian
Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010). This table presents the results of
adding an interaction term to Model 3 to determine whether PT mayors in poorer
municipalities use protest less because they have an affinity with the PT at the
national level. We find no statistical connection between PT mayors interacted with
city wealth and the use of protest.
Independent Variables
Mayor’s Party*Administrator’s Household Income
(logged)
Administrator’s Household Income (logged)
Mayor’s Party
CSO Contract
Contact with the State
Elected Leaders

Odds Ratio (SE)
0.91
(0.33)
1.07
(0.30)
1.06
(0.39)
0.97
(0.48)
1.01
(0.55)
1.17
(0.32)
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Independent Variables
Constant
Log Likelihood
Wald X2 (4)
N
Pseudo R2
Note:
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Odds Ratio (SE)
2.00**
(0.26)
-331.28
165
827
0.38

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 4a.2: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian
Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010). We also assess the above possibilities using a variable recording a left-leaning council majority vs. a non-left leaning
council majority. We find no statistically significant results using this variable.
Independent Variables
Council Partisanship*Administrator’s Household Income
(logged)
Administrator’s Household Income (logged)
Council’s Partisanship
CSO Contract
Contact with the State
Elected Leaders
Constant
Log Likelihood
Wald X2 (4)
N
Pseudo R2
Note:

Odds Ratio (SE)
0.92
(0.39)
1.06
(0.44)
1.08
(0.42)
1.07
(0.54)
1.03
(0.52)
1.12
(0.36)
2.15**
(0.27)
-320.63
164
835
0.32

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 4a.3: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian
Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010). We substitute the administrator’s
level of education for their salary and use it in otherwise-identical models of CSO
interaction with the state. Results are similar to those obtained using our primary
models.
Independent Variables
Contract*Administrator’s Education
Administrator’s Household Income (logged)
Mayor’s Party
CSO Contract
Contact with the State
Elected Leaders

Odds Ratio (SE)
0.95*
(0.21)
0.93
(0.34)
1.20
(0.54)
0.95
(0.42)
0.91*
(0.25)
1.19*
(0.12)
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Odds Ratio (SE)
1.54**
(0.13)
-321.37
157
843
0.32

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

One might reasonably believe these professional organizations with mostly salaried
employees are distinct from volunteer organization in terms of their resources, connections and professionalism. We have no quarrel with the general argument on this
count and we remove the professional organizations from the dataset to determine if
the results of estimation change in their absence. We find the results, presented in the
technical appendix, are similar without the professional organizations, indicating
there are no systematic differences between professional and non-professional CSOs
in our dataset. Our results also remain broadly similar when any one city is removed
from the dataset providing evidence the results are not driven by one particular
Brazilian municipality.
We also want to know what explains whether CSOs value their interaction with
the state and pursue external opportunities for training in support of their mission.
We collected data on whether CSOs report learning valuable information or improving their understanding of how government works from attending workshops, conferences or meetings with state officials. We believe wealthier CSOs have relatively
more professional experience and knowledge of how to pursue their organizations’
missions than poorer CSOs. Thus, these wealthy CSOs may not feel like they learn a
lot from their contact with the state or their attendance of workshops, conferences,
etc. because they already have this information. The perceived educational value of
interacting with the state provides another opportunity for us to assess why CSOs
pursue particular strategies of participation and forms of interaction. We therefore
specify a second broad model to explain the determinants of CSO learning.
The dependent variable reflects CSO administrators’ assessments of how much
they learned about government through attendance of state-supported educational/information workshops forums. These workshops take on different forms, but
they most often offer a combination of a political history of the new policymaking
venues and basic policymaking information. The sessions are typically geared toward
individuals with high school or less education in order to help them gain the necessary knowledge to better engage incremental policymaking processes. It is coded “0”
if the respondent did not believe attending educational meetings increased
knowledge of how government works or how best to pursue their groups’ interests
and “1” if attendance increased knowledge in these areas. 19% of respondents believed attendance did not increase knowledge while 81% believed it did.
Model 2. CSO Learning from Participation= 0 + 1 (The CSO Administrator’s Salary (logged))+ 2 (The Mayor’s Party)+ 3 (CSO on Contract)
+ 4 (CSO Elected Leaders)+ 5 (Contact with other State Entities) +
Key Independent Variable: The CSO Administrator’s Household Income
We believe CSOs from wealthier communities will be less likely to report beneficial
educational experiences from attending workshops for the same reasons relatively
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wealthy CSO administrator’s will have less contact with the state. These relatively
wealthy, professional, knowledgeable organizations have the resources, connections
and education to use the state. They may report relatively small knowledge gains
from the workshops because they already have more of the information to begin
with, thus making attending workshops a less productive experience. Table 5a presents the results of estimation using CSO learning as the dependent variable.
Table 5a: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Contact with the State in
Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010(Using an interaction between CSO administrators’ household incomes and State Contracts). This table presents the odds ratios
for each dependent variable.
Independent
Variables

Administrator’s
Household Income*Contract
Administrator’s
Income
CSO Contract
Mayor’s Party
Elected Leaders
Contact with
Other Parts of
the State
Note:

Odds Ratio for
Attending a
Policy Council
Meeting
(SE)

Odds Ratio
for Attending
a National
Conference
(SE)

Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Municipal Chamber
(SE)

Odds Ratio
for Contact
with Mayor’s
Cabinet
(SE)

0.94**
(0.02)

0.87**
(0.03)

0.90**
(0.04)

0.84**
(0.03)

0.77
(0.22)
2.23**
(0.18)
0.94
(0.13)
1.03**
(0.02)

0.81
(0.20)
2.57**
(0.16)
0.91
(0.10)
1.03**
(0.02)

0.69
(0.22)
2.10**
(0.18)
0.94
(0.10)
1.01**
(0.01)

0.70
(0.18)
3.42**
(0.21)
0.83
(0.15)
1.05**
(0.02)

1.02
(0.02)

0.93
(0.04)

0.96
(0.02)

1.05
(0.01)

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 5a.1: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian
Municipalities Learned “Valuable Information” from interaction with the State (2010)
Independent Variables
Per Capita GDP (Logged)

Odds Ratio (SE)
0.87**
(0.05)

Administrator’s Household Income
Mayor’s Party
CSO Contract
Had Contact with Other Parts of the
State
Constant
Log Likelihood
Wald X2 (4)
N
Pseudo R2
Note:

1.003
(0.61)
1.03**
(0.03)
1.06**
(0.02)
1.51**
(0.09)
-290.85
163
819
0.24

Odds Ratio (SE)

0.76**
(0.08)
1.005
(0.50)
1.05**
(0.03)
1.12*
(0.13)
1.23**
(0.06)
-294.37
150
792
0.26

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.
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Table 6a: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations’ Participation in Protests in
Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. This table presents the odds ratios for each
variable.
Independent Variables
Per Capita GDP (Logged)

Odds Ratio (SE)
0.75**
(0.01)

Administrator’s Household Income
Mayor’s Party
CSO Contract
Elected Leaders
Contact with the State
Note:

1.01
(0.05)
0.95**
(0.03)
1.07*
(0.05)
0.98**
(0.01)

Odds Ratio (SE)

0.68**
(0.01)
1.01
(0.05)
0.92**
(0.03)
1.03*
(0.03)
0.95**
(0.01)

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 6b: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian
Municipalities Learned “Valuable Information” from interaction with the State (2010).
Our results for all models remain broadly similar with or without professional CSOs
in the dataset. This table presents the results of estimation without professional
CSOs in the dataset.
Independent Variables
Per Capita GDP (Logged)

Odds Ratio (SE)
0.85**
(0.12)

Administrator’s Household Income
Mayor’s Party
CSO Contract
Had Contact with Other Parts of the
State
Constant
Log Likelihood
Wald X2 (4)
N
Pseudo R2
Note:

1.08
(0.57)
1.09*
(0.05)
1.14**
(0.08)
1.58**
(0.06)
-284.35
142
608
0.21

Odds Ratio (SE)

0.89**
(0.06)
1.04
(0.49)
1.07*
(0.13)
1.10*
(0.12)
1.30**
(0.04)
-293.12
163
599
0.25

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.
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Table 7a: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian
Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010). This table presents the odds ratio
for attending or organizing protests.
Independent
Variables
Contract*Administrator’s
Household
Income (logged)
Administrator’s
Household
Income (logged)
Mayor’s Party

Odds
Ratio (SE)

Odds
Ratio (SE)

0.73**
(0.10)

0.62**
(0.05)

0.97
(0.05)

0.95
(0.04)

0.94
(0.05)

0.95
(0.04)

0.98
(0.04)

1.05
(0.08)
1.03
(0.03)
1.04
(0.06)
1.10
(0.15)

1.06
(0.07)
1.02
(0.04)
1.02
(0.04)
1.07
(0.14)

0.97*
(0.02)
0.99
(0.04)
0.96*
(0.04)
1.05*
(0.04)

1.02
(0.05)
0.97
(0.04)
1.06
(0.08)
0.98*
(0.02)

1.04*
(0.03)
0.98
(0.03)
0.91*
(0.02)
1.18*
(0.10)

CSO Contract
Contact with the
State
Elected Leaders
Note:

Odds
Ratio (SE)

Odds
Ratio (SE)

Odds
Ratio (SE)

0.85**
(0.03)

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 7a.4: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian
Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010). Finally, our results for all models
remain broadly similar with or without professional CSOs in the dataset. This table
presents the results of estimation without professional CSOs in the dataset.
Independent Variables
Contract*Administrator’s Household Income
(logged)
Administrator’s Household Income (logged)
Mayor’s Party
CSO Contract
Contact with the State
Elected Leaders
Constant
Log Likelihood
Wald X2 (4)
N
Pseudo R2
Note:

Odds Ratio (SE)
0.88**
(0.06)
0.93
(0.53)
1.08
(0.45)
1.02
(0.56)
1.07
(0.55)
1.14*
(0.26)
2.17**
(0.14)
-308.34
176
625
0.32

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.
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Table 8: Correlation Chart of Independent Variables in Tables I, II, III, IV and V
City
GDP
City GDP
Admin
salary
Mayor’s
Party
Contract
Elected
Leaders
Contact
with the
State

Admin
Salary

Mayor’s
Party

Contract

Elected
Leaders

Contact
with
State

1.00
0.17

1.00

0.11

0.06

1.00

0.22

0.29

0.26

1.00

0.21

0.13

-0.02

0.09

1.00

-0.20

-0.17

0.18

0.31

0.24

1.00

